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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba 
Hardman Auto Sales, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 8663 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
ARTHUR HARDMAN 
PRELIMINARY ST~TEMENT 
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driv-
ing a 1951 International Pickup Truck east on 
Highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Salt 
Lake City when the vehicle suddenly veered from 
the south center of the highway to the north side, 
where it collided with an automobile driven by plain-
tiff, George W. Williams, resulting in serious in-
juries to him. The plaintiff brought this action to 
recover damages against Nathan Child, Arthur 
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Hardman, dba Hardman Auto Sales and Barrus 
Motor Company. The suit was brought against 
Hardman as a defendant on the theory that Child 
was his servant or agent and against Barrus Motor 
Company on the theory that the steering apparatus 
and the wheels of the vehicle were in a defective 
condition, which the Barrus Motor Company knew 
or should have known. 
The allegations of negligence were denied by 
all three defendants. Hardman also denied that 
Child was his agent or servant. 
When the plaintiff had rested, the court, upon 
motion, dismissed the Barrus Motor Company from 
the action. The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendents Hardman 
and Child in the sum of $78,055.17. 
!This appeal is taken by the defendant Hardman 
upon the grounds that there was no evidence to sub-
mit to the jury on the issue of whether Child was 
his servant or agent and that his motion for a 
directed verdict of no cause of action should have 
been granted. He also contends that the court erron-
eously gave certain instructions and refused to give 
others, and that the verdict was so excessive as to 
indicate the jury was governed by passion or pre-
judice. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Hardman is a resident of Sunset, 
Utah, where he operated a garage and used car lot 
(R. 122). The defendant Child had known Hardman 
for some time before December 20, 1955 (the date 
of the accident) . They were friends; Child had pur-
chased cars from him in the past. 
Sometime before December 20th Child told 
Hardman he was interested in buying a used pick-
up truck (R. 124). A short time later Hardman in-
formed Child that he had located an International 
1951 pickup truck which might interest him, and 
arrangements were made for Child to accompany 
Hardman to Tooele, Utah in order that he could see 
the vehicle ( R. 82) . They drove from Sunset to 
Tooele in Hardman's wrecker truck. Hardman did 
not pay Child any wages or compensation for mak-
ing the trip, nor did Child pay any of the trip ex-
p8nse ( R. 133). 
After arriving in Tooele they inspected the 
pickup truck; took it for a test drive during which 
both drove it. The test revealed that certain minor 
repairs were necessary. Child said if those defects 
were fixed he would take the truck ( R. 94) . Hard-
man told Child that he would not pay Barrus Motor 
Company for the truck unless Child would take it 
as he did not want to stock any merchandise at that 
time of the year ( R. 131). Barrus Motor made the 
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repairs. The truck was then accepted by Child at the 
agreed purchase price of $650.00 plus the turn-in 
value of Child's old truck (R. 97 and 132). Child in-
tended to pay Hardman $500.00 cash on the pur-
chase price when they got back to Sunset and to ob-
.. tain credit for the balance (R. 97). Hardman 
paid Barrus $600.00 for the truck. They did not have 
the Registration Certificate but did deliver to Hard-
man the Certificate of Title, which he did not de-
liver to Child (R. 125, 126). He intended to place 
"Stickers" on the truck when he got back to his 
place of business .( R. 128). The purpose of the 
stickers is to allow the purchaser to drive the vehicle 
for tw·enty days in order that he may have time to 
obtain license plates (R. 132). The Certificate of 
Title obtained from Barrus would be sent in to the 
State Motor Vehicle Department for a new Certifi-
cate of Title which v1ould be issued to Child in his 
name (R. 135). 
The deal between Hardman and Child for the 
sale of the truck to Child was virtually complete in 
Tooele ( R. 128). The paper work \vould be done 
\vhen they returned to Sunset (R. 139). Hardman 
did not intend to have Child sign a Conditional Sales 
Contract nor did he intend to retain title until the 
balance of the purchase price was paid (R. 137). 
A note for the balance was mentioned but there was 
no discussion as to its terms. Hardman assumed 
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Child would sign a note ( R. 138). Hardman was 
willing to accept Child's credit ( R. 140) . 
Before leaving Tooele on the return trip Child 
considered the truck his and wanted to drive it 
back ( R. 99-100) . Hardman considered the truck 
belonged to Child, .his only interest being to obtain 
the purchase price (R. 141). Hardman gave no in-
structions on driving the truck to Child; however, 
he did state that generally on trips of this kind 
they occasionally passed each other ( R. 129-30, 
134). On the return trip Child drove the pickup. 
truck. Hardman towed another vehicle behind his 
wrecker. 
The collision with the car driven by the 
plaintiff happened about one and one-half miles 
west of Morton's Salt Plant on U. S. Highway 40! 
After the accident Hardman made no demand on 
Child for the purchase price of the truck because 
-Child.was· off work for seven months and then lost 
his job (R. 332). 
STA:TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD 
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERV-
ANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON 
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFEN-
DANT. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING 
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD 
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE 
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERV-
ANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN. 
This case arose out of the same accident, and 
the evidence on the issue of whether Child was act-
ing in the capacity of Hardman's agent or servant in 
driving the truck is substantially the same as the 
evidence in the case of Ida M. Johnson. Adminis-
tratrix of the estate of C. Tennyson Johnson, De-
ceased, vs. Arthur Hardman, et al., No. 8647, now 
pending on appeal in this Court, and the case of 
Walter Anderson vs. Arthur Hardman, et al., No. 
8580, on which this Court has rendered a decision, 
not yet final as the defendant will file a Petition 
for Rehearing. Both parties made an exhaustive re-
search of the law applicable on the issue of Hard-
n1an's responsibility for Child's operation of the 
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truck in the appeal of those cases. The defendant 
has no additional authories to cite to the Court on 
the same issue in this appeal and in order to avoid 
needless repitition, refers the Court to his briefs 
filed on the appeal in the two preceding cases. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON 
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFEN-
DANT. 
Appellant contends that the court's instructions 
considered as a whole were prejudicially erroneou~ 
to the defendant in that his theory of the case as 
supported by the evidence was not submitted to the 
JUry. 
In the court's instruction number 1, which pur-
ported to set out the contentions of the parties, the 
jury was told in substance that plaintiff alleged 
Child was Hardman's agent and that Child was 
negligent in driving the pickup truck; that the de-
fendants denied they were negligent, but the in-
struction omitted the contention of Hardman that 
Child was not his agent. Inasmuch as the instruction 
purports to state the contentions of the parties, 
omitting the issue of agency was probably inter-
preted by a jury of laymen as meaning there was 
no issue on agency even though they were told in 
the court's subsequent instruction number 2 that the 
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burden of proof to show that Child was Hardman's 
agent or servant was on the plaintiff. 
The court's instruction number 6 reads as fol-
lows (R. 3'79) : 
"You are instructed that whether one 
person is agent of another depends upon right 
of control of one over another, and if you find 
from the evidence that after delivering the 
truck to Child at Tooele Hardman had no con-
trol or right of control over the operation of 
the vehicle and that it was not being driven 
by Child for or on behalf of Hardman, then 
you are instructed that Child was not the 
agent of Hardman at the time of the accident 
and your verdict must be for the defendant 
Hardman." · 
The italicized part of this instruction requires 
the jury to find that Child was Hardman's agent, 
jf the truck was being driven "for or on behalf of 
Hardman" even though the evidence showed Hard-
man had no control or right of control over the oper-
_ation of the vehicle, which is not in accord with the 
law in this state. Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 
207 P. 2d 809; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 
P. 2d 437. 
Defendants earnestly contend that there was 
no evidence whate~er to show that the relationship 
of master and servant existed between Hardman 
and Child. Child was not paid any wage or compen-
sation by Hardman. In making the trip to Tooele he 
was motivated only by his interest in buying the 
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truck. However, the issue of whether Child was 
Hardman's servant or employee was submitted to 
the jury in instructions 2, 9 and 12. The law is well 
settled that it is error to instruct the jury on an 
issue of liability not supported by the evidence. See. 
State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 
Utah 416, 25 P. 2d 612. 
In the case of Clay v. Dunford (Utah), 239 P. 
2d 1075, it was held to be prejudicial error to in-
truct on assumption of risk when the facts in the 
case did not present the issue. 
The repetition of the issue of master and ser-
vant at the end of instructions 2, 9 and 12 unduly 
en1phasize plaintiff's theory of recovery. In the case 
of Shields v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 99 
Utah 307, 105 P. 2d 347, 349, the court stated: 
"The reiteration of given propositions to 
a jury in the instructions does not have judi-
cial approval." 
After reviewing the detailed instructions the 
court stated: 
"And the ensuing emphasis on applicable 
laws favorable to plaintiff's side as the re-
sult of the continued reference, and the re-
peating of certain law propositions resulted 
in the unbalancing of the charge and error." 
This case was cited with approval in the later 
Utah decision of Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 
P. 2d 1073. 
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In its instruction number 8 the court submitted 
the issue of whether Hardman and Child were en-
gaged in a joint venture at the time of the accident, 
which defendant contended was error and that the 
evidence showed as a matter of law that this relation-
ship did not exist in that it was undisputed that 
Child did not contribute or pay anything towards the 
expense of the trip. Hardman was not riding in the 
truck driven by Child at the time of the accident, 
the purchase price had been agreed upon and Child 
had taken possession of the vehicle, Hardman's only 
remaining interest in the transaction being to receive 
the purchase price. If Hardman had been involved in 
the accident, could his negligence have been imputed 
to Child? The question suggests a negative answer. 
If the relationship between them was joint venture, 
it must work both ways. This issue was again sub-
mitted to the jury and repeated in instruction num-
ber 12, further, tending to emphasize the proposi-
tion. 
POINT III. 
THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE, APPEARING 
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF P ASSlON AND PREJUDICE. 
The defendant Hardman does not contend that 
the plaintiff's injuries were not serious or that he 
will not sustain permanent disability as a result. 
The attending physician testified that in his opinion 
the plaintiff would be unable in the future to do 
physical work of the type that he was doing at the 
10 
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time of the accident but might be able to do a sitting 
job if qualified for it (R. 189). The doctor was un-
able to say whether or not the plaintiff would obtain 
a union of the broken left femur ( R. 183). He an-
ticipated excellent results on the injury to the right 
knee (R. 184). The prognosis of recovery of injury 
to the right arm was indefinite ( R. 185). 
There can be no doubt that the jury was ex-
tremely sympathetic for the plaintiff, which was 
reflected in their verdict. Anticipating such might 
happen the defendant in Request No. 15 asked the 
court to instruct the jury as follows (R. 41) : 
''You are instructed that your verdict 
must be based solely and exclusively upon the 
evidence in the case. You should not be gov-
erned by passion, prejudice, sympathy or any 
motive whatever, except fair and impartial 
consideration of the evidence, and you must 
not under any circumstances allow any sym-
pathy which you may have or entertain for 
the plaintiff to influence you in any degree 
whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. The 
court does not charge you not to sympathize 
with the plaintiff because it is only natural 
and human to sympathize with persons who 
have sustained loss, affliction or misfortune, 
but the court does charge you not to allow that 
sympathy to enter in to your consideration of 
the case or to influence your verdict." 
which was refused. 
We appreciate that whether a verdict is exces-
sive damages on the facts and circumstances 
11 
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of each case. Nothing would be gained by citing the 
court numerous decisions involving different fact 
situations. The case of Stamp v. Union Pacific, 5 
Utah 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279, reaffirms the principle 
and earlier decisions that the reviewing court has 
the power to reduce a verdict clearly given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, and the opinion 
analyzes the situations where the amount of the ver-
dict so indicates. 
We believe that this verdict is unreasonably 
high in comparison with other verdicts in this juris-
diction. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the evidence es-
tablished as a matter of law that Child was not 
Hardman's agent in the manner in which he drove 
the pickup_ truck, and the verdict should be set aside 
and a judgment of no cause of action entered in 
favor of the defendant Hardman, that the court's 
instructions were prejudicially erroneous and the 
verdict was so excessive as to clearly indicate the 
jury was governed by passion or prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant Arthur Hardman 
1~ 
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